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ABSTRACT
Social information can profoundly influence behavior, perceptual and evaluative
judgments, and even physiological response to pain. Yet, few studies have looked at its
influence on emotion experience, a construct that is inherently social. Here, we describe
a study that investigated the effect of others’ emotion ratings on self-reported and
physiological indices of emotion in response to pleasant and unpleasant pictures. The
results indicate that social information can influence subjective emotion experience to
pleasant and unpleasant picture stimuli. Social information also modulated the late
positive potential component of the event-related potential in response to unpleasant
picture stimuli, providing support for a modulated encoding mechanism of social
influence on emotion.
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1. Introduction
Our interactions and relationships with others profoundly influence how we
experience, express, and regulate our emotions (Manstead, 2001; Parkinson,
2011). Yet few studies of the emotion process have considered the influence of
other people (Fischer & van Kleef, 2010; Manstead, 2005). The limited work on
interpersonal emotion transfer (IET) has largely focused on two specific
mechanisms, emotional contagion and social appraisal. Emotional contagion is a
process by which emotions converge automatically when individuals are together
through a direct mirroring or mimicking process (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson,
1994). Social appraisal, on the other hand, occurs when another person’s
emotions change how we evaluate the emotional value of a situation (Manstead,
2005). Both processes demonstrate social influence on emotional experience,
but research on the specific mechanisms through which emotional contagion
occurs remains inconclusive and research on social appraisal is limited
(Parkinson, 2011). Social influence research provides one promising avenue for
better understanding the general mechanisms that underlie IET. The field of
social influence provides an expansive body of literature to inform such research
and its simple paradigms provide ideal conditions for investigating the
neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie social influence on emotion.
One recent study found that emotion ratings from others strongly
influenced participants’ subjective ratings of the emotional effects of music
excerpts (Egermann, Kopiez, & Altenmuller, 2013). Furthermore, conformist
behavior was stronger in social information conditions than in conditions in which
1
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the ratings came from a nonsocial source (i.e. computer-produced ratings).
Although this study provides initial support for the social conformity of emotion,
the findings are limited to the context of music stimuli, and it remains unclear
whether the internal affective processes that give rise to subjective experience
were influenced. Continued investigation of social influence on emotion from the
lens of social conformity will allow for a better understanding of the motives and
mechanisms responsible for the influence of social factors on the emotion
process. First, the separate literatures on IET and social influence will be
reviewed.

1.1 Interpersonal Emotion Transfer
1.1.1 Emotional Contagion
Emotional contagion is theorized to be a two-stage process comprised of
behavioral mimicry and facial and postural feedback (Hatfield, Cacioppo, &
Rapson, 1994). In the first stage, people automatically mimic the facial and
postural behaviors of others. Behavioral mimicry is thought to be an automatic
mechanism for blending in with the environment that often occurs outside of
conscious awareness (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Desire for affiliation increases
behavioral mimicry (Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008) and the mimicking of
negative emotions is specific to behaviors performed by in-group members
(Bourgeois & Hess, 2008). Several studies have found that emotional mimicry
relies on identifying the emotion being expressed, rather than simply copying its
physical configuration (Halberstadt, Winkeilman, Niedenthal, & Dalle, 2009;
Tamietto et al., 2010). Halberstadt and colleagues (2009) exposed participants to
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morphed facial expressions containing equal proportions of happy and angry
features but paired with either the label “happy” or “angry.” Participants’ facial
expressions during a second, non-matched viewing corresponded to the emotion
label from the first viewing. The researchers concluded that participants
responded to their interpretation of—rather than the content of—the facial
expression. Tamietto and colleagues (2010) found that participants who were
shown emotional posturing responded with facial expressions mimicking the
emotion. Taken together, these studies suggest that emotional mimicry is a
relatively automatic process for affiliating with others and blending into the
environment. Furthermore, this process seems to depend upon identifying the
emotion being expressed, rather than just responding to its physical
configuration.
In the second stage of the emotional contagion process, individuals
internalize the affective state related to the copied behavior through a feedback
mechanism (Hatfield et al., 1994). Research on this second stage has produced
mixed and inconclusive results (Parkinson, 2011). One of the most famous
studies in support of this concept instructed participants to hold a pen with their
mouths in such a way that their facial expression resembled a smile in one
condition and a frown in the other (Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). Participants
in the smile condition subsequently rated cartoons as funnier and more amusing,
however the effect size was small and based on liberal statistical criteria. More
recent studies have failed to replicate this finding (Andreasson & Dimberg, 2008;
Soussignan, 2002).

3
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An alternative account for emotional contagion relies only on witnessing,
rather than copying, others’ emotional expressions (Neumann & Strack, 2000).
Neumann & Strack (2000) argue that perceiving others’ emotional expressions
directly activates neural action codes that can trigger the associated emotion. For
example, observing others’ expressions of disgust produces similar brain
responses to personally experiencing disgust (Wicker et al., 2003). One potential
explanation for this brain response is an associative learning mechanism through
which we learn to associate certain emotional expressions with the emotions
themselves (Parkinson, 2011).
Whether emotional contagion occurs in the presence or absence of
behavioral mimicry, it is a direct response to another person’s emotional
expression. Social appraisal, on the other hand, requires making a judgment
about an emotional stimulus based upon the information gleaned from that social
information.

1.1.2 Social Appraisal
Research on social appraisal has sought to improve upon the appraisal
theory of emotion by considering the role of the social world in the construction of
emotion (Manstead & Fischer, 2001). Manstead and Fischer (2001) suggest that
people appraise the way others judge, evaluate, or behave in response to an
emotional event and these appraisals influence the way the individual
experiences and expresses emotions in response to that event. For example,
watching a comedy depicting sexist humor in the presence of a friend who is
sensitive to that humor might influence both your internal perception of the movie
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(e.g. how funny you find it) and how you express your emotions while viewing the
film (e.g. how frequently you laugh).
Based on this account, social appraisal is often conceptualized as an
inferential process in which people make judgments about the evaluative
implications of others’ emotions (Hareli & Hess, 2010). However, social appraisal
might occur in the absence of such an explicit inferential process. Indeed, one
study involving 1-year-olds too young to engage in such a reasoning process
found that toddlers were more likely to crawl toward a visual cliff if their mothers
were smiling and less likely if their mothers were expressing fear (Sorce, Emde,
Campos, & Klinnert, 1985). Although the toddlers made judgments about the
emotional value (relative risk) of the visual cliff in response to their mothers’
emotional expressions, the judgment occurred outside of an explicit inferential
process. More recently, Bayliss, Frischen, Fenske, and Tipper (2007) found that
participants’ liking of household objects was significantly affected by emotional
expressions directed at the objects. None of the participants were able to identify
these expressions as affecting their liking of the objects, providing support for an
automatic social appraisal process.
Research on both emotional contagion and social appraisal have provided
support for the automatic nature of IET. However, the underlying mechanisms
responsible for these processes remain unclear. One area of research that might
provide valuable insight into potential IET mechanisms is the literature on social
influence. Both emotional contagion and social appraisal seem to rely on
identifying the emotion being expressed. Once the emotion is identified, it
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becomes social information that might exert its influence on emotion experience
in the same way that social information leads to conformity in other contexts. The
existing literature on social influence is reviewed in the following section.

1.2 Social Influence
1.2.1 Motives of Social Conformity
Many underlying motives lead to agreement or disagreement with others.
Deutsch and Gerard (1955) were the first to posit a dual-motive scheme that
distinguishes between informational influence, which arises from a desire to form
accurate perceptions of reality, and normative influence, which arises from the
desire to form and maintain relationships with others. The extant literature has
upheld the distinction between informational and normative influence (Cialdini &
Goldstein, 2004), but the two are interrelated and can be difficult to disentangle
(David & Turner, 2001). More recently, many researchers have adopted a
tripartite distinction (e.g. Chaiken, Pomerantz, & Giner-Sorolla, 1996; Cialdini &
Trost, 1998; Wood, 1999), which identifies goals related to accuracy, goals
related to affiliation, and goals related to maintaining a positive self-concept.
The goals outlined above are not mutually exclusive and conformity
behaviors often serve all three goals (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Contributions
from classic social psychological theory and the field of social cognitive
neuroscience have sought to explain the mechanisms by which these goals lead
to social influence. Traditionally, social influence researchers assumed
informational and normative influences were related to unique mechanisms for
generating changes in judgment as well as unique types of change. Specifically,
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informational influence was thought to instigate deeper processing of the
stimulus and result in enduring, private changes in judgment. Normative
influence, on the other hand, was believed to lead to less information analysis
and to result in only public judgment changes (Wood, 2000). This traditional view
has been challenged by the dual-mode processing model of persuasion (Petty &
Wegener, 1998), which argues that motives for change are not preferentially
related to specific change mechanisms or outcomes (Wood, 2000). Furthermore,
recent advances in the literature have suggested that private, enduring changes
in judgment are not necessarily the result of deeper processing, but may arise
from modulated encoding of the object(s) being judged (Schnuerch & Gibbons,
2014). The various mechanisms by which social influence might be exerted are
reviewed in the following sections.

1.2.2 Social Reinforcement Learning and Cognitive Inconsistency
The main theories of social influence’s neural bases have arisen from a
large body of work that has identified the detection of conflict as a central
neurocognitive mechanism of social conformity (for a review see Schnuerch &
Gibbons, 2014). One explanation for this conflict detection mechanism is that
social conformity is based on social reinforcement learning (Klucharev, Hytgnen,
Rijpkema, Smidts, & Fernandez, 2009). Conformist behavior is neurally
reinforced through increased reward signaling when a judgment is made in line
with the group and through negative error signaling when a judgment is made
that conflicts with the group (Campbell-Meiklejohn, Bach, Roepstorff, Dolan, &
Frith, 2010; Klucharev et al., 2009; Shestakova et al., 2013). Individuals adjust
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their behavior and act in conformist ways in order to reduce conflict and increase
reward (Klucharev et al., 2009). These reinforcement signals likely rely on the
posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC) for the detection of errors (Klucharev et
al., 2009) and striatal activity for coding expected reward (Campbell-Meiklejohn
et al., 2012).
Social reinforcement learning as proposed by Klucharev and colleagues
(2009) relies on the detection of a conflict between individual and group
judgment. More recently, Izuma and Adolphs (2013) proposed an alternative
account of reinforcement learning that relies on cognitive inconsistency when a
judgment deviates from a liked group, as well as when judgment is in line with a
disliked group. Izuma and Adolphs found similar pMFC activation under both
conditions. Rather than signaling a simple prediction error, the authors suggested
this activation reflected a discrepancy between what would have been cognitively
consistent and what actually happened (Izuma & Adolphs, 2013).

1.2.3 Modulated Neural Representation of Task-Relevant Stimuli
The mechanisms of social influence discussed previously rely on the
notion that conformity arises to avoid deviance from group norms. Another
explanation is that social information can actually influence individuals’
perception of the world. In his early observations of social conformity in a visual
perception task, Asch (1951) suggested that social pressure might actually
augment perception. More recently, social cognitive neuroscience has begun to
explore Asch’s proposition, finding support for modulated encoding of stimuli in
the presence of social information.
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Berns and colleagues (2004) first demonstrated that perception can be
altered by social influence in an fMRI study of conformist behavior during a
mental rotation task. Conformity was associated with functional changes in an
occipital-parietal network, classically associated with perception. This functional
change was especially salient when conformist judgments were made in line with
other people rather than a computer. The authors concluded that social
information influenced early information processing, rather than simply altering
later decision-making processes.
Further support for social influence on early perceptual processes comes
from an event-related potential (ERP) study of conformist behavior in a visual
perception task (Trautmann-Lengsfield & Hermann, 2013). Decreased amplitude
of the early visual P1 component and the later P3 component was observed
when participants made a judgment in line with an incorrect group judgment. The
early modulation of the ERP, occurring as early as 100 ms after stimulus onset,
suggests an effect of social information on early unconscious visual perception
and mental representation of task-relevant stimuli.
Social influence on basic encoding has also been demonstrated in the
context of evaluative tasks that ask participants to make judgments about their
preferences (Mason, Dyer, & Norton, 2009; Zaki, Schirmer, & Mitchell, 2011).
Mason and colleagues (2011) found that activity in a brain region associated with
the experience of reward—the caudate, a part of the striatum—differentiated
socially tagged popular from unpopular symbols. Activity in the medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC), a brain region implicated in thinking about the attitudes and
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opinions of others, differentiated between symbols that were and were not
socially tagged. The authors concluded that the mPFC and caudate likely work in
concert to encode socially tagged stimuli. Indeed, previous studies have
implicated the mPFC in coding for reward (Amodio & Frith, 2006; McClure,
Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004), and the caudate might be particularly
involved in representing reward that is socially derived (Sanfey, 2007; KingCasus et al., 2005). These findings suggest an interplay between normative and
informational influence on the representation of reward and preference in the
brain.
Brain regions associated with encoding subjective value have also been
found to be susceptible to social influence (Zaki et al., 2011). When rating the
attractiveness of faces for which peer judgments had already been presented,
conformist judgments were accompanied with modulated engagement of the
nucleus accumbens and orbitofrontal cortex. Zaki and colleagues (2011)
concluded that exposure to group norms affected the neural representation of the
stimuli’s subjective value.
Socially induced memory errors have also been found to arise from
modulated neural representations of the memory (Edelson, Sharot, Dolan, &
Dadai, 2011). Persistent memory errors were related to greater activity in regions
associated with memory encoding and maintenance at the time of exposure to
social influence (Edelson et al., 2011). The researchers observed heightened
activity in the hippocampal complex that they believe reflected the encoding of
new stable representations. This process was mediated by heightened amygdala
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activity, a region that plays a key role in modulating memory-related hippocampal
activity as well as social and emotional processing. Functional connectivity
analysis performed by Edelson and colleagues revealed heightened functional
connectivity between the left amygdala and bilateral anterior hippocampus.
These findings suggest that external social information can change the way
memories are represented in the brain, and this process likely involves
intercedence from the amygdala.
Peripheral physiology has also provided important insight into social
information’s potential to influence sensation and perception. Using galvanic skin
response (GSR), Koban and Wager (under review) found that physiological
response to thermal heat pain was influenced by others’ pain ratings. Although
neuroimaging studies are necessary to elucidate the underlying mechanisms
responsible for the modulated physiological pain response, these findings
suggest that even basic sensory processes such as the experience of pain can
be modulated by social information.
Taken together, these studies provide support for a theory of social
influence that arises from early, unintentional modulation during the encoding
process. If this is the case, conformist behavior does not only emerge to
decrease the conflict that arises from disagreeing with the group or increase the
reward signals associated with making a judgment that is in line with the group,
but instead may result from an actual change in the neural representation of the
object being judged.
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One process by which basic encoding might be affected is through
expectancies (Schnuerch & Gibbons, 2014; Koban & Wager, under review).
Expectations have been shown to affect early, sensory stages of processing
(Pessoa, Kastner, & Ungerleider, 2003; Shuler & Bear, 2006), and appear to
mediate the effects of conditioning on pain reports (Kirsch, 2004). However, it is
unclear whether early sensory processing, rather than later decision-making
processes, was being influenced by expectancies in the case of pain reports.
Koban and Wager (under review) addressed this question by measuring
expectancies between the presentation of peer pain reports and the onset of pain
stimuli. Expectancy effects fully mediated the relationship between social
information and physiological pain response, providing support for expectancy as
a process through which social information might influence basic encoding.

1.2.4 Summary of Neurocognitive Mechanisms of Social Influence
Social reinforcement learning and cognitive inconsistency arise from an
error detection mechanism of social influence (Schnuerch & Gibbons, 2014). In
social reinforcement learning, neural error signals indicate deviation from the
group and neural reward signals indicate judgment that is in line with the group
(Klucharev et al., 2009). Conformist behavior is learned through punishment and
reward learning. A cognitive inconsistency account of this process suggests that
error detection occurs not only when a judgment is made that deviates from the
group, but also when a judgment is made that is in line with a disliked group
(Izuma & Adolphs, 2013). Thus, this error detection is the result of cognitive
inconsistency that arises when what happens deviates from what would be ideal.

12
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A modulated encoding mechanism of social influence, however, relies on the
assumption that social information can actually change the way the object being
judged is neurally represented (Berns et al., 2004; Edelson et al., 2011; Mason et
al., 2009; Trautmann-Lengsfield & Hermann, 2013; Zaki et al., 2011). Support for
a modulated encoding mechanism of social influence does not necessarily stand
in competition with other theories of social influence, such as socialreinforcement learning and cognitive inconsistency (Schnuerch & Gibbons,
2014). Certainly, more intentional adjustments of judgments toward group norms
can occur in the absence of modulated representations of what is being judged.
The mechanisms underlying conformity might work in concert with one another,
or might occur separately depending upon the nature of the social information,
the object being judged, and the context of the judgment task.

1.3

The Current Study

The aim of the current study is to elucidate the mechanisms underlying
social influence on emotion experience. First, we seek to demonstrate the effects
of social influence on self-reported emotion ratings in response to pleasant and
unpleasant pictures. We hypothesize that self-reported emotion intensity ratings
will be higher on trials with social information indicating high emotion intensity
ratings from others than trials with social information indicating low emotion
intensity ratings from others.
Second, we aim to test a modulated encoding mechanism of social
influence on emotion. If the basic encoding of emotional stimuli is affected by the
social information, we expect to see changes in the physiological response to
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emotional stimuli. Specifically, we expect to see an increase in the late positive
potential (LPP) component of the ERP on trials with social information indicating
high emotion intensity ratings. The LPP is a sensitive measure of the intensity of
both negative and positive emotion experience (Hajcak & McNamura 2010).
Modulated physiological response to the emotional stimuli would suggest an
effect on early information processing, rather than later decision-making
processes. Furthermore, we expect this process to be mediated by expectancy
effects, based upon previous findings that expectancy mediates the relationship
between social information and physiological response to pain (Koban & Wager,
under review).

2. Method
2.1 Participants
38 healthy volunteers were recruited from undergraduate psychology
classes at William and Mary. Four participants did not complete data collection
due to equipment issues or environmental distractors on the day of the study.
Five participants were excluded for insufficient artifact-free trials (<8 trials in any
condition; Moran, Jendrusina, & Moser, 2013) for electroencephalogram (EEG)
analysis. The final sample included 29 participants (20 females; M = 19.4 years,
SD = .89 years). Participants were screened for psychiatric and neurologic
conditions prior to participation in the study. All participants provided written
informed consent and received partial course credit for their participation. The
study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the College of William
and Mary.
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2.2 Materials and Procedures
2.2.1 Stimuli. 72 unpleasant and 72 pleasant pictures were taken from the
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, &Cuthbert, 2008).
Unpleasant pictures were selected based upon normative valence ratings below
the 15th percentile, high normative arousal ratings, and for limited duplication of
content. Within the negative stimulus set, 24 images were taken from below the
5th 10th’ and 15th percentiles of normative valence ratings, respectively. The 24
pictures with the highest arousal ratings in each interval, without duplicating
content from another image in that interval, were included in the stimulus set.
Pleasant pictures were selected based upon normative valence ratings above the
85th percentile. Within the pleasant stimulus set, 24 pictures were selected from
the 85th, 90th, and 95th percentiles using the same criteria described above for
unpleasant stimuli. This procedure resulted in 72 unpleasant pictures with a
mean valence rating of 2.45 (S.D. = .396) and mean arousal rating of 6.058 (S.D.
= .553) and 72 pleasant images with a mean valence rating of 7.415 (S.D. =
.315) and a mean arousal rating of 5.672 (S.D. = .655).
The social information stimuli exactly resemble the stimuli used in Koban
& Wager (under review). 144 different stimuli were generated (72 SocialLow and
72 SocialHigh). Each social rating stimulus depicts 10 vertical lines (“others’
ratings”) on a horizontal line that closely resembles the visual analog scale used
for participants’ ratings. The SocialLow stimuli were sampled from a normal
distribution with M = 0.3 (S.D. = .015) and the SocialHigh stimuli were sampled
from a normal distribution with M = 0.7 (S.D. = .015).
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2.2.2 Procedure. Experiment protocol closely resembled the procedures used by
Koban and Wager (under review). Participants were instructed that we are
interested in their subjective experience of emotion while viewing pleasant and
unpleasant pictures and how well they are able to predict their own emotional
experience based on the reported experiences of others. Participants were
instructed that the social information stimuli reflected emotion intensity ratings
from 10 previous participants. Participants then performed six blocks of 24 trials
each. See Figure 1 for a representation of the sequence of a trial. In each trial, a
social information stimulus was presented first for 4500 ms. Participants were
then asked to predict their upcoming emotions on a visual analog scale.
Following their prediction, a picture was presented for 3,000 ms. Participants
were asked to rate their actual experienced emotions on the same visual analog
scale immediately after picture presentation. Three of the blocks contained only
pleasant pictures and three of the blocks contained only unpleasant pictures.
Trial and block order was counterbalanced across participants. The pairing of
social information and picture stimuli was randomized, therefore social
information was non-predictive of picture valence. For the unpleasant picture
blocks, the visual analog scale was explained such that the low (left) side of the
scale represented neutral/no emotion and the high (right) side of the scale
represented completely negative emotion. For the pleasant picture blocks, the
visual analog scale was explained such that the low (left) side of the scale
represented neutral/no emotion and the high (right) side of the scale represented
completely positive emotion.
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2.2.3 Late Positive Potential. In addition to self-reported emotion intensity
ratings, the LPP component of the ERP was measured. The LPP is an ERP
component that reflects facilitated attention to emotional stimuli. It is a sustained
positive deflection that is larger for emotional compared to neutral stimuli (Hajcak
& Macnamara, 2010). Emotion regulatory attempts have also been found to
reliably reduce the magnitude of the LPP and the degree of the LPP modulation
is positively related to reductions in self-reported emotion experience (Hajcak &
Nieuwenhuis, 2006).
2.2.4 EEG Recording. Continuous EEG recordings were taken from 62 scalp
electrodes based on the 10-20 system (Jasper, 1958), as well as two reference
electrodes placed on the left and right mastoids. Horizontal electrooculogram
(EOG) was recorded from two facial electrodes placed approximately 1 cm to the
left of the left eye and 1 cm to the right of the right eye. Impedances were kept
below 15 kO.
2.2.5 Data reduction. All data was re-referenced to the average of the two
mastoids and band-pass filtered with cutoffs of 0.01 and 30 Hz. EEG epochs
were extracted, starting 200 ms prior to picture onset and lasting for a total
duration of 1200 ms (baseline correction: -200 to 0 ms). Artifacts were identified
using the following criteria: a voltage step of more than 50 pV between sample
points and a voltage difference of 200.0 pV within a trial (Foti & Hajacak, 2008).
Contaminated epochs were dropped from subsequent analyses. Previous studies
have shown that the LPP is typically most pronounced at centro-parietal
electrodes (Hajcak & MacNamara, 2010; Moser, Krompinger, Dietz, & Simons,

17

18

2009). The LPP was evaluated as the mean amplitude at electrode CPz between
300 and 1000 ms post-stimulus (see Hajcak & Nieuwenhuis, 2006).

2.3 Statistical Analyses
Self-reported emotion ratings were subjected to a 2 (social information: high vs.
low) x 2 (picture valence: pleasant vs. unpleasant) x 3 (picture intensity: low,
moderate, high) repeated measures ANOVA. Because no main effect of picture
intensity was found, it was dropped from all subsequent analyses. Mean LPP
amplitude was subjected to a 2 (social information: high v. low) x 2 (picture
valence: pleasant v. unpleasant) repeated measures ANOVA. Mediation was
tested using a method for testing mediation in within-subject designs developed
by Judd, Kenny, & McClelland (2001). First, difference scores were calculated for
both expectancy ratings and emotion intensity ratings by subtracting the
SocialLow scores from the SocialHigh scores. The emotion rating difference score
was then regressed onto the expectancy rating sum and difference scores.

3. Results
There were statistically significant main effects of Valence, F (1, 28) =
12.943, p < .0 1 ,7]p = .316, and Social Information, F(1,28) = 52.278, p < .001, rfa
= .651, on self-reported emotion intensity ratings. Figure 2 depicts mean selfreported emotion intensity ratings and indicates that subjective emotion
experience was more intense for unpleasant pictures (M = 59.375, S.D. =
10.813) compared to pleasant pictures (M = 52.37, S.D. = 6.565), and for
SocialHigh trials (M = 61.76, S.D. = 7.415) compared to SocialLow trials (M =
49.984, S.D. = 9.408).
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Expectancy ratings were not a significant mediator of the relationship
between social information and self-reported emotion intensity ratings. Using the
within-subjects mediation method described above, we found both the
expectancy sum and difference scores to be nonsignificant predictors of the
emotion intensity ratings difference score, ps > .285.
Analysis of the EEG data revealed a statistically significant main effect of
Valence, F (1,28) = 6.963, p < .05, rj% = .199, on the mean amplitude of the LPP.
There was also a significant Valence x Social Information interaction, F (1,28) =
7.167, p < .05, r)l = .204. Paired sample f-tests revealed a statistically significant
difference between SocialHigh and SocialLowconditions for unpleasant pictures
only, t (28) = 2.441, p = .021., and between pleasant and unpleasant pictures for
the SocialHigh condition only, t (28) = -3.133, p = .004. There was no significant
difference between SocialHigh and SodaJLowconditions for pleasant pictures, t
(28) = -0.270, p = .789, or between pleasant and unpleasant pictures in the
SocialLow condition, t (28) = -1.704, p = .099. False discovery rate for multiple
comparisons was controlled for using Benjamini and Hoschberg’s (1995) method.
Figure 3 depicts the LPP at electrode CPz for unpleasant pictures only, and
depicts greater amplitude for SocialHigh trials compared to SocialLow trials. Figure
4 depicts the LPP at electrode CPz for pleasant pictures only, and indicates no
difference between SocialHigh and SocialLow conditions. Figure 5 depicts the
LPP at electrode CPz in the SocialHigh condition only, and depicts greater
amplitude for unpleasant pictures compared to pleasant pictures. Figure 6
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depicts the LPP at electrode CPz in the SocialHigh condition only, and indicates
no difference between pleasant and unpleasant pictures.

4. Discussion
The aims of the current study were 1) to test whether subjective emotion
experience is influenced by others’ emotion ratings in a simple social influence
paradigm, and 2) to test a modulated encoding mechanism of this influence. The
results indicate that emotion ratings from others can influence subjective emotion
experience in response to pleasant and unpleasant pictures and physiological
response to unpleasant pictures. The observed differences in self-reported
emotion ratings and electrophysiological response between SocialHigh and
SocialLow conditions adds to the literature on IET in two key ways. First, these
findings establish the feasibility of investigating IET in a simple social influence
paradigm. Second, these findings suggest that others’ emotions serve as a form
of informational influence on subjective emotion experience, leading to
modulated encoding of emotional stimuli and conformity of emotion reports.
Most of the existing research on IET involves participants directly
observing the emotion expressions of others (Parkinson, 2011). Some
hypothesized mechanisms of IET (e.g., behavioral mimicry) even rely on
witnessing these expressive behaviors (Hatfield et al., 1994). The current study
demonstrates that subjective emotion experience can be influenced by
information about others’ emotional responses without directly witnessing these
responses. The observation of IET in a simple social influence paradigm allows
for investigations of its underlying mechanisms from the perspective of a field
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that has already made strides in neurocognitive research (see Schnuerch and
Gibbons, 2014). Since Asch’s famous line experiment in 1951, an extensive body
of research has sought to explain social influences on human behavior. .
Developments in social cognitive neuroscience have allowed for investigations
into the neurocognitive mechanisms responsible for conformist behavior.
Because IET involves the conformity of emotional experience and expression to
the emotions of others, it likely results from similar neurocognitive mechanisms
as other forms of social conformity.
Research on social influence also offers insight into the potential motives
behind IET. The most consistent distinction made in the social influence literature
is between normative and informational influence. Normative influence arises
from the desire to form and maintain relationships with others, whereas
informational influence arises from the desire to form accurate perceptions of
reality (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Because participants in the current study made
their emotion ratings in private, the observed conformist behavior was likely not
the result of a desire to form or maintain relationships with others. Instead,
others’ emotion ratings likely served as sources of information that participants
used to help them make accurate judgments about the emotional value of the
pictures. Indeed, previous research on social comparison suggests that the
emotional responses of others are used to evaluate the intensity, nature, or
appropriateness of one’s emotional state (Schacter, 1959).
The second goal of the current study was to test a modulated encoding
mechanism of social influence on emotion. If others’ emotion ratings influenced
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the encoding of the pictures’ emotional value, we expected to see increased LPP
activity during picture viewing for SocialHigh trials compared to SocialLow trials.
We found the hypothesized pattern of LPP activity for unpleasant pictures only,
suggesting a modulated encoding mechanism of social influence on emotion in
response to unpleasant picture stimuli. However, this pattern did not hold for
pleasant picture stimuli.
Previous studies have demonstrated that attempts to decrease negative
emotions can reliably reduce the magnitude of the LPP, and attempts to increase
negative emotions can reliably increase the magnitude of the LPP (Hajcak &
Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Moser, Most, & Simon, 2010). However, only attempts to
decrease positive emotions have been shown to modulate the LPP (Krompinger,
Moser, & Simons, 2008). Krompinger and colleagues found that attempts to
increase positive emotion in response to pleasant picture stimuli were
unsuccessful in modulating the magnitude of the LPP. In light of this, one
explanation for the Valence x Social Information interaction observed in the
current study is that the effect of social influence on emotion was driven by
SocialHigh trials. Because an increase in subjective positive emotion in response
to pleasant picture stimuli is not necessarily associated with an increased LPP,
whereas an increase in subjective negative emotion in response to unpleasant
picture stimuli is associated with an increased LPP, we would expect to see the
observed pattern of results if others’ high emotion intensity ratings upregulated
participants’ emotional responses. Further support for this explanation is the
statistically significant difference in LPP magnitude between pleasant and
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unpleasant pictures in the SocialHigh condition only. This suggests that the
SocialHigh stimuli enhanced the LPP in response to unpleasant pictures, driving
the LPP difference between unpleasant and pleasant pictures. Future studies
should include a control condition in which no social information is presented to
test this explanation. If SocialHigh trials are indeed driving the results, there
should be little or no difference between the SocialLow and control conditions.
An alternative explanation is that a modulated encoding mechanism of
social influence on emotion is indeed selective for negative emotions. If this is the
case, future studies should seek to replicate the current findings using alternative
measures of modulated encoding. Because the LPP is not necessarily
responsive to the upregulation of positive emotions in response to pleasant
picture stimuli, fMRI could provide an alternative measure of whether social
information is modulating brain activity in response to pleasant stimuli. In addition
to more rigorous tests of a modulated encoding mechanism of social influence on
positive emotions, future research should investigate other neurocognitive
mechanisms that could explain the observed relationship between others’
emotion ratings and subjective emotion experience in response to pleasant
picture stimuli. Our next step will be to test whether a social reinforcement
learning mechanism can explain the observed relationship. Social reinforcement
learning would affect the decision-making component of making an emotion
rating, rather than the encoding of the emotional stimuli. This could explain the
observed differences in the subjective ratings of, but not electrocortical response
to, pleasant pictures.
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A secondary finding of the current study was a main effect of picture
valence on both self-reported emotion intensity ratings and LPP amplitude.
Unpleasant pictures elicited higher self-reported emotion intensity ratings and
increased LPP amplitudes compared to pleasant pictures. Although the LPP is
responsive to both negative and positive emotions, it is also influenced by
arousal (Hajcak & Macnamara, 2010). The mean normative arousal rating of our
unpleasant stimuli set (M = 6.034, S.D. = .582) was significantly higher than the
mean normative arousal rating of our pleasant stimuli set (M = 5.6596, S.D. =
.658), t (141) = 3.604, p < .001. Due to the normative valence and arousal ratings
of the lAPs stimuli set, this is an expected artifact of our selection procedure. The
difference in arousal between our pleasant and unpleasant pictures likely
explains the observed differences in emotion ratings and LPP magnitude.
Although the findings from the current study extend our understanding of
how social information influences emotion experience, several important
limitations should be considered. First, two important dimensions of emotion,
arousal and valence, were collapsed into one measure of “emotion intensity” to
increase participants’ understanding of the task. Future studies should
distinguish between these separate dimensions both in the social information
presented to participants and in the subjective emotion ratings obtained from
participants in order to better understand which dimension of emotion experience
is affected. The nature of the social information in the current study was also
limited to emotion ratings said to come from ten other participants. Future studies
should test whether emotion experience can be altered by just one other
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person’s emotion rating, as research on IET typically involves participants’
emotional response to one other person. The relationship of the “others” should
also be manipulated to investigate whether in-group membership is necessary for
influence to occur. Finally, the sample used in the current study was limited to
mostly White, mostly female undergraduate students. Future studies should seek
to extend these findings to more diverse populations.
Taken together, the findings from the current study suggest that social
influence on subjective emotion experience does not rely on witnessing others’
emotional responses, and its underlying mechanisms can be tested in a simple
social influence paradigm. Thus, recent developments in neurocognitive research
on social influence should inform future investigations of the neural mechanisms
that underlie IET. The current study also provides support for a modulated
encoding mechanism of social influence on emotion in response to unpleasant
picture stimuli. Information about others’ emotional responses to unpleasant
stimuli influenced the encoding of unpleasant pictures, resulting in subjective and
physiological changes in emotion experience. This result was likely driven by an
increase in negative emotions in response to emotion ratings from others
indicating high emotion intensity.
Elucidating the mechanisms that underlie social influence on emotion has
important implications for our understanding of the emotion generative process in
a social context. Emotion experience and expression frequently occur in social
settings and a growing body of literature has begun to direct attention to the need
to consider influences of other people in research on emotion (Fischer & van
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Kleef, 2010; Manstead, 2005). In addition to influencing the emotion generative
process, other people can impact emotion regulatory processes. Research on
interpersonal emotion regulation has only recently been organized into a
conceptual framework (see Zaki & Williams, 2013), and investigations of the
mechanisms underlying specific interpersonal regulatory strategies are limited.
Many forms of interpersonal emotion regulation, such as coregulation and
sharing of affective states (Zaki & Williams, 2013) rely on or result in IET, making
investigations into the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie IET particularly
useful in understanding the neural basis of interpersonal emotion regulation.
Although we discuss the benefits of investigating interpersonal emotion
regulation and IET from the lens of social influence research, we do not suggest
that these methods should replace the existing approaches of emotional
contagion, social appraisal, and interpersonal emotion regulation researchers.
Social influence paradigms offer unique opportunities to study the neurocognitive
mechanisms that underlie general forms of IET, however distinct mechanisms
might also underlie specific forms of IET such as emotional contagion and social
appraisal.

5. Conclusion
The results of the current study suggest that subjective emotion
experience can be influenced by others’ emotion ratings. Social information also
modulated the magnitude of the LPP in response to unpleasant pictures,
providing support for a modulated encoding mechanism of social influence on
emotion. These findings suggest that directly observing others’ emotion
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expression is not necessary for IET to occur. This affords investigations of IET
from the perspective of social influence research. The field of social influence
provides an expansive literature to inform research on IET, and its simple
paradigms are ideal for employing neurocognitive methods to elucidate the
mechanisms that underlie IET.
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Figure 1. Illustration of the sequence a trial.
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Figure 2. Mean self-reported emotion intensity ratings as a function of Valence
and Social Information. Unpleasant pictures resulted in higher emotion intensity
ratings than unpleasant pictures. SocialHigh trials resulted in higher emotion
intensity ratings than SocialLow trials. Note that error bars are standard error.
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Figure 3. Mean late positive potential (LPP) amplitude measured at CPz as a
function of social information for unpleasant pictures. The LPP is reliably
enhanced in response to unpleasant pictures for SocialHigh, trials compared to
SocialLow trials.
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Figure 4. Mean late positive potential (LPP) amplitude measured at CPz as a
function of social information for pleasant pictures. There is no significant
difference in LPP amplitude between SocialHigh and SocialLow conditions.
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Figure 5. Mean late positive potential (LPP) amplitude measured at CPz as a
function of picture valence for the SocialHigh condition. The LPP is reliably
enhanced in response to unpleasant pictures in the SocialHigh condition only.
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Figure 6. Mean late positive potential (LPP) amplitude measured at CPz as a
function of picture valence for the SocialLow condition. There is no significant
difference in LPP amplitude between pleasant and unpleasant pictures in the
SocialLow condition.
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